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ABSTRACT 
This paper assesses the Jaw relating to corporate defamation plaintiffs. 
Defamation law imposes a constant limit on freedom of speech, and it is in the 
public interest that this threat amount to the least necessary interference. This 
paper argues that the right of bodies corporate to sue in defamation is an 
illogical extension of the right of individuals to sue protect personal 
reputation. This extension is both unnecessary, in that corporate reputational 
interests are adequately protected through alternative causes of action, and 
undesirable, in that it is contrary to the public interest in free speech. 
The uncertainty of defamation law, particularly in the corporate area, coupled 
with the significant resources of large corporate plaintiffs, creates a real risk 
that freedom of expression will be subjected to the 'chilling effect'. Media 
debate and popular criticism is demonstrably restricted by the threat of 
defamation liability. 
The current law relating to corporate defamation plaintiffs is ineffective in 
clarifying their ability to sue, and in protecting freedom of speech. This paper 
argues that defamation actions by bodies corporate should be abolished, and 
that corporate reputation should be protected through actions in injurious 
falsehood, for personal defamation, and under section 9 of the Fair Trading 
Act 1986. 
Word Length 
This text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes, and bibliography) 
comprises approximately 14,500 words. 
.4 
I INTRODUCTION 
"It must be confessed at the beginning that there is a great deal of the Jaw of 
defamation which makes no sense. It contains anomalies and absurdities for 
which no writer ever has a kind word". 1 The United States Supreme Court has 
labelled defamation "an oddity of tort law".2 This paper advocates reforming 
New Zealand's defamation law to remove one of these anomalies. 
In a submission to the United Nations Human Rights Committee, the anti-
censorship organisation Let in the Light' stated that "libel actions and almost 
as important the threat of libel actions have been used to prevent further 
coverage of sensitive matters" .3 Defamation actions pose a significant threat to 
freedom of speech. 
The traditional conception of a defamation action is of an individual suing a 
large media organisation for harming his or her reputation .4 On this basis, 
defamation has developed into a pro-plaintiff tort. The burden placed on the 
defamation plaintiff is remarkably low: "The individual need not prove that 
any loss resulted from the libelous publication; nor need he prove that it was 
false; all he has to prove is that the defendant criticised him. The defendant . . 
. is liable not only for intentional implications but also for unforeseen and 
unforeseeable inferences".5 The apparent injustice of imposing liability on thi s 
basis has been tolerated, in part because of the difficulties of proof facing the 
plaintiff, and in part because of the probability that the defendant enjoys a 
considerable resource advantage over the plaintiff.6 
The rise of the corporate defamation plaintiff calls the pro-plaintiff structure 
of defamation into question. Corporate plaintiffs may have significantly 
greater resources with which to undertake litigation, and may be able to 
demonstrate very large damages.7 One commentator has observed that "[t]his 
1WP Keaton, DB Dobbs, RE Keaton, and DG Owen Prosser and Keaton on The Law of Torts 
(5ed, West Publishing, St Paul , 1984) 77 l. 
2Gertz v Robert Welch Inc (1974) 418 US 323, 349 (Powell J) [Gertz]. 
3J Penzi "Libel Actions in England , A Game of Truth or Dare? Considering the Recent 
Upjohn Cases and the Consequences of 'Speaking Out"' (1996) 10 Temp Int1 & Comp LJ 2 11 , 
227 [Penzi] . 
4See eg Hulton v Jones [1910) AC 20 (HL). 
SJA Weir "Local Authority v Critical Ratepayer - A Suit in Defamation" [1972) CLJ 238,239 
[Weir]. 
6Weir, above n 5, 239-240. 
7For example, a publically listed company might claim damages in respect of any diminuation 
in its market capitalisation caused by a defamatory publication. 
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sea change in econonuc pos1t1ons may sharply alter the effective rights 
positions of plaintiffs and defendants in defamation actions, without any 
change in legal principles" .8 The potential for injustice in this area has been 
evident in a number of cases. In Bognar Regis UDC v Campion9 a local 
authority employed a defamation action to silent a prominent critic by 
bankrupting him for damages of £2000 and costs of £34,445.24. 10 In 
McDonald's v Stee/ 11 the giant fast-food chain brought a defamation action 
against two pamphleteering protesters which has resulted in the longest trial in 
English judicial history and legal costs of over £10 rrullion. 12 Any right of a 
body corporate to sue in defamation is an extension of the "earlier law which 
conferred such a right only on natural persons", 13 and as such must be shown 
to be necessary and to be justified on policy grounds. 
Logic and justice demand that corporate defamation plaintiffs are recognised 
as distinct to individual plaintiffs. In New Zealand, this recognition 1s 
contained in section 6 of the Defamation Act 1992, which provides that: 
Proceedings for defamation brought by a body corporate shall fail unless the body 
corporate alleges and proves that the publication of the matter that is the subject of 
proceedings -
(a) Has caused pecuniary loss; or 
(b) Is likely to cause pecuniary loss -
to that body corporate. 
Part II of this paper will examine the source and justification for section 6 and 
set out the existing law relating to corporate defamation plaintiffs. Part III wilJ 
assess potential classes of corporate plaintiffs and argue that the extension of 
defamation rights to corporate plaintiffs is unjustified on policy grounds and 
an unnecessary limit on free speech. Part IV will argue that New Zealand's 
current corporate plaintiff rule is an inadequate reconciliation of reputation 
and free speech. Part V will assess two possible models of corporate 
8JB Attanasio "The Economic Contingency of Legal Rights?" (1995) 39 St Louis ULJ 1163, 
1164 [Attanasio]. 
9[1972) QB 169 (HC, per Browne J) [Bognar Regis]. 
IOweir, above n 5, 238; 245. 
11 unreported (31 March 1999) QBENF 97/1281/1 (CA, per Pill and May LJJ and Keene J) 
[McDonald's]. 
12MA Nicholson "McLibel: A Case Study in English Defamation Law" (2000) 18 Wis Int1 LJ 
I, 2-3 [Nicholson]. 
l3Dhlomo Nov Natal Newspapers [1989) I SA 945,953 (Appellate Division, per Rabie ACJ) 
[Natal Newspapers] . 
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defamation plaintiff law to identify the characteristics of an effective model. 
Part VI will propose that there should be an absolute bar to defamation actions 
by corporate plaintiffs, accompanied by increased attention to the capacity of 
other tortious remedies to regulate criticism of bodies corporate. 
II CORPORATE PLAINTIFFS UNDER EXISTING LAW 
A The Origin of Section 6 of the Defamation Act 1992 
The rule that bodies corporate may sue in defamation is a long-standing one. 
In Metropolitan Saloon Omnibus Company v Hawkins 14 Pollock CB held: 
"[t]hat a corporation can at common law sue in respect of a libel there is no 
doubt." This rule has been unquestioningly accepted in New Zealand_ Is It has 
been observed that "[i]t would be very odd if a corporation had no means of 
protecting itself against wrong; and, if its property is injured by slander, it has 
no means of redress except by action."16 
In considering the scope of a body corporate's right of action, Lord Reid has 
observed that a "company cannot be injured in its feelings, it can only be 
injured in its pocket. Its reputation can be injured by a libel but that injury 
must sound in money." 17 This approach differentiates the position of the body 
corporate from that of the individual defamation plaintiff. The individual 
plaintiff may recover damages at large without reference to specific 
demonstrable loss. 18 Such awards are "a solatium rather than a monetary 
recompense for harm measurable in money",19 and are commonly described as 
"general damages".20 Individual plaintiffs may recover specific pecuniary loss, 
or "special damages"21 in addition to general damages. 
Lord Reid's dictum is the direct origin of section 6 of the Defamation Act. His 
approach was explicitly endorsed by the Faulks Committee in the United 
14(1859) 4 H & N 87, 90; 157 ER 769, 770 [Metropolitan Saloon]. 
15See eg Atlantic Union Oil v Bodle (1933] GLR 441 (SC per Reed J). 
16South Hetton Coal Company v North-Eastern News Association (1894] l QB 133, 142 (CA 
per Lopes LJ) [South Hetton Coal] . 
17Lewis v Daily Telegraph (1964] AC 234,262 (HL). 
18Rookes v Barnard (1964] AC 1129, 1221 (HL per Lord Devlin). 
19Uren v John Fairfax & Sons (1966) 117 CLR 118, 150 (HC per Windeyer J); Cassell v 
Broome [ 1972] AC l 027, 1071. 
20Ratcliffe v Evans [1892] 2 QB 524,528 (CA per Bowen LJ) [Ratcliffe]. 
21 Ratcliffe, above n 20,528. 
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Kingdom22 and the McKay Commjttee in New Zealand.23 The report of the 
McKay Committee provided the basis of New Zealand's Defamation Act,24 
and was itself influenced by the conclusions of the Faulks Committee.25 Both 
Comrruttees concluded that corporate defamation plaintiffs should be 
restricted to claims for special damages, with general damages unavailable. 
Both also recommended that the corporate action should arise where special 
damage (or "pecuniary damage" in the words of the McKay Committee26) had 
occurred or was likely to occur. This allowance for likely special damage 
arose from the recognition that legitimate pecuniary damage, such as harm to 
goodwill, may not immediately manifest itself in actual loss.27 
The recommendations of the McKay Committee were:28 
(a) It be enacted that no action for defamation should lie at the suit of any body 
corporate unless such body corporate can establish either -
(i) That it has suffered actual pecuniary loss; or 
(ii) That the words were likely to cause it pecuniary loss. 
(b) The term "pecuniary loss" used above should be adopted rather than the term 
"special damage" 
As is apparent from comparison with the eventual section 6 of the Defamation 
Act 1992,29 the substance of the McKay Committee's recommendation was 
adopted. 
B The Effect of Section 6 of the Defamation Act 1992 
The intended effect of section 6 of the Defamation Act is set out by Doug 
Graham, speaking as Minister of Justice in moving that the Defamation Bill 
should be read a second time. He stated that clause which became section 6 
"clarifies the law relating to defamation proceedings that have been brought by 
22Report of the Committee on Defamation (1975, Her Majesty's Stationary Office, Cmmd 
5909) paras 329, 335, 342 [Faulks Committee]. 
23Recommendations on the Law of Defamation: Report of the Committee 011 Defamation 
(1977) paras 359-362 [McKay Committee]. 
24(10 November 1992) 531 NZPD 12144. 
25See McKay Committee, above n 23, para 361. 
26McKay Committee, above n 23, para 362. 
27McKay Committee, above n 23, para 360. 
28McKay Committee, above n 23, para 364. 
29See above Part I. 
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bodies corporate. They may sue only if they can prove that the defamatory 
publication has caused pecuniary loss or is likely to cause pecuniary loss. At 
present, there is some conflicting case law30 on this point."31 
As a result of section 6, it is certain that actual or likely pecuniary loss is "an 
essential ingredient in a corporate plaintiff's cause of action",32 rather than a 
mere restriction on the damages recoverable once the cause of action is made 
out. As an element of the cause of action, the requirement for actual or likely 
pecuniary loss is a threshold question for the corporate plaintiff, who must 
also prove all the standard elements of a defamation action. The common law 
remains determinative of these standard elements, and of their application to 
corporate plaintiffs who have met the threshold loss requirement. 
Section 6 is expressed negatively. Defamation proceedings by a corporate 
plaintiff "shall fail unless" actual or likely pecuniary loss is shown. This does 
not mean that all corporate plaintiffs have a right to bring proceedings upon 
establishing the requisite Joss. The wording of section 6 leaves open the 
possibility that defamation proceedings brought by some bodies corporate will 
fail despite the existence of actual or likely pecuniary loss. The section does 
not clarify the law relating to which categories of body corporate may sue. The 
common law remains the source of law on this point. 
The practical effect of section 6 is to clarify a single point relating to corporate 
defamation plaintiffs. Once the threshold damage requirement of section 6 is 
satisfied, defamation proceedings brought by bodies corporate are governed by 
the common law. 
C Corporate Defamation Plaintiffs in New Zealand 
Upon establishing loss satisfying the section 6 threshold, the position of the 
corporate defamation plaintiff remains distinct to the individual plaintiff in 
relation to establishing the right to sue, proving defamation, and assessing 
damages. 
30See below Part II C 4. 
31(10 November 1992) 531 NZPD 12144. 
32M Gillooly The Law of Defamation in Australia and New Zealand (The Federation Press, 
Sydney, 1998) 27 [Gillooly]. 
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1 Common law defamation generally 
Broadly, the tort of defamation consists of three elements. To establish 
liability, there must be a defamatory statement: a statement which may "tend 
to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking members of society 
generally" .33 The statement must identify the plaintiff: the statement must be 
"such as reasonably in the circumstances would lead persons acquainted with 
the plaintiff to believe that he was the person referred to" .34 The statement 
must be published: it must be communicated to some person or persons other 
than the plaintiff.35 
A defendant may escape liability by proving that the defamatory statement 
was true,36 that it was a statement of an honestly held opinion,37 or that the 
statement was privileged. 38 
2 Specific classes of corporate plaintiff 
The term "body corporate" suggests a uniformity among corporate defamation 
plaintiffs. The existence of such uniformity is doubtful. There are a number of 
categories of body corporate which may seek to bring a defamation action, and 
Commonwealth common law suggests a diversity of positions. 
Companies may sue to protect their trading reputation.39 A church may be able 
to bring a defamation action.40 A trade union may bring an action41 provided it 
33Sim v Stretch [1936] 2 All ER 1237, 1240 (HL per Lord Atkin) . 
34David Syme & Co v Canavan (1918) 25 CLR 234,238 (HC per Isaacs J) [Canavan]. 
35Pullman v Hill & Co [1891] l QB 524,527 (CA per Lord Esher MR). 
36see Defamation Act 1992, s 8 [DA]. 
37See DA, s 9. 
38See DA, s 13 in relation to absolute privilege. See also DA, s 19 and Lange v Atkinson 
unreported (21 June) CA52/97 (CA) [Lange 2000]. 
39South Hetton Coal, above n 16, 145 (per Kay LJ). Mount Cook Group v Joh11sto11e Motors 
[1990] 2 NZLR 488,497 (HC per Tipping J) . 
40Anderson v Church of Scientology [1981] WAR 279,285 (Full Court of the Supreme Court 
of WA, per Smth J) [Anderson]. Church of Scientology v Readers Digest Services [1980] l 
NSWLR 344, 355-6 (Common Law Division, per Hunt J) [Readers Digest]. 
41 National Union of General and Municipal Workers v Gillian [1946] l KB 81, 88 (CA per 
Uthwatt LJ) [Gillian]. Australian Liquor, Hospitality and Miscellaneous Workers Union 
(Miscellaneous Workers Division) WA Branch v Mulliga11 (1995) 15 WAR 385,389 (SC per 
Anderson J). 
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has legal personality.42 Other associations, such as clubs or societies, are 
generally able to sue in defamation provided they have legal personality.43 
It is doubtful whether a political party would be allowed to bring a defamation 
action.44 Likewise, a governmental body cannot sue,45 although there is some 
doubt as the scope of this bar in relation to government trading corporations.46 
3 Common law position of corporate plaintiffs 
To succeed in a defamation action, a corporate plaintiff must show that a 
statement was defamatory of the body corporate itself: "[t]he words 
complained of, in order to entitle a corporation or company to sue for libel or 
slander, must injuriously affect the corporation as distinct from the individuals 
who compose it" .47 Defamation is actionable where the plaintiff's reputation is 
harmed. Bodies corporate have reputations which are important to their ability 
to function effectively. A statement which harms this corporate reputation may 
harm the operation of the body corporate, and is actionable.48 
It has been suggested that a body corporate cannot be defamed by an 
allegation of which it cannot be guilty. "If one said of a company - 1t is a 
murderer' or 'it is a forger,' I have no doubt that the company could not bring 
an action, because a company cannot forge and a company cannot commit 
murder".49 This example has been doubted50 on the basis of expanded 
42EETPU v Times Newspapers [1980) 3 WLR 98, 106 (HC per O'Connor J) . 
43Chinese Empire v Chinese Newspaper (1907) 13 BCR 141, 142-143 (SC, per Morrison J) 
[Chinese Empire]. St Michaels Extended Care Society v Frost [1994) 6 WWR 718,726 (QB, 
per Cawsey J). 
44Goldsmith v Bhoyrul [1997) 4 All ER 268,271 (HC per Buckley J) [Goldsmith]. Healy v 
Askin [1974) l NSWLR 436,440 (Common Law Division, Lee J) [Healy]. See also Argus 
Printing and Publishing v Inkatha Freedom Party [1992) 3 SA 568,600 (Appellate Division, 
per Hoexter JA) [Argus] allowing a political party to sue in defamation. 
45Derbyshire CC v Times Newspapers, [1993) AC 534,551 (HL, per Lord Keith) 
[Derbyshire] overruling Bognar Regis, above n 9, 175 (HC per Browne J). Ballina Shire 
Council v Ringland (1994) 33 NSWLR 680,691,710 (CA per Gleeson CJ and Kirby P, 
Mahoney JA dissenting) [Ballina]. 
46New Zealand Apple and Pear Marketing Board v Apple Fields unreported (24 July 1997) 
High Court, Wellington Registry, CP 211/96 (per M Thomson) [NZ4PMB]. British Coal 
Co,poration v National Union of Mineworkers unreported (28 July 1996) English High Court 
(per French J) [British Coal] . 
47South Hetton Coal, above n 16, 141 (per Lopes LJ). 
48South Hetto11 Coal, above n 16, 147 (per Kay LJ). 
49D & L Caterers v D'Ajou [1945) l KB 365, 366 (CA per Lord Goddard) . 
sop Milmo & WYH Rogers Gatley on Libel and Slander (9ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 
1998) 184 [Gatley]. 
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corporate liability, for instance for manslaughter, but the underlying rule 
remains logicaJly necessary. 
Bodies corporate have successfully brought defamation actions in respect of 
allegations of insolvency5 1 which could create difficulties in obtaining credit, 
allegations of poor working conditions52 which could impede staff 
recruitment, and other criticisms which may make people reluctant to deal 
with the organisation.53 
4 Nature of damages recoverable by corporate plaintiffs 
Section 6 of the Defamation Act is expressed so as to make actual or likely 
pecuniary loss an element of a corporate defamation claim. The section does 
not expressly provide that the corporate plaintiff, having established the 
requisite pecuniary harm, cannot go on to claim damages in respect of non-
pecuniary harm. However, it would be illogical to interpret section 6 as 
allowing such recovery. 
In Andrews v John Fairfax & Sons,54 Mahoney JA found that the corporate 
plaintiff had established special damage satisfying the common law threshold 
for corporate defamation actions. The tort having been made out, Mahoney JA 
awarded damages for inter alia "injury to the company's reputation as such", 
in the form of a "solatium". This equates to an award of general damages, as 
would be found in an individual defamation action. Mahoney JA's approach 
was expressly rejected by Pincus J in ABC v Comalco.55 In Mount Cook 
Group v Johnstone Motors56 Tipping J approved Pincus J's approach, holding 
that the special damage requirement was both an element of the tort and a 
restriction on damages preventing recovery of general damages. This 
concurrence of authority suggests that an Andrews interpretation of section 6 
would be untenable. 
5 l Metropolitan Saloon, above n 14. 
52South Hetton Coal, above n 16. 
53See Derbyshire, above n 45, 547 (HL per Lord Keith) for a discussion of situations in which 
a body corporate may succeed in a defamation suit. 
54[1980] 2 NSWLR 225,254 (CA). 
55(1986) 68 ALR 259,348. (Full FC) [Comalco]. 
56Above n 39,497. 
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A corporate plaintiff satisfying the section 6 threshold might claim damages in 
respect of loss of actual and anticipated profits,57 expenses incurred in 
mitigating loss,ss impairment to staff recruitment,59 difficulty in obtaining 
credit, or reduced public donations.60 A publicly listed company might claim 
massive damages in respect of any diminution in its market capitalisation 
caused by a defamatory publication.6 1 
An award of exemplary damages to a corporate plaintiff may also be possible. 
Section 28 of the Defamation Act provides that "[i]n any proceedings for 
defamation, punitive damages may be awarded against a defendant only where 
that defendant has acted in flagrant disregard of the rights of the plaintiff" 
(emphasis added). The absence of reference to corporate plaintiffs, in light of 
their explicit recognition at section 6, suggests that corporate plaintiffs are 
able to recover exemplary damages.62 
5 Impact of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
To date, the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 has had a negligible impact 
on corporate defamation plaintiffs. Section 14 of the Act provides that 
"[e]veryone has the right to freedom of expression, including the freedom to 
seek, receive, and impart information and opinions of any kind in any fo1m". 
Courts have held that the right to sue in defamation is a reasonable limit on 
freedom of speech prescribed by law and demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society, such as is acceptable under section 5 of the Bill of 
Rights.63 Further, section 28 of the Act preserves existing rights and freedoms, 
which has been held to include a right to reputation.64 The right to freedom of 
speech has been reconciled with this right to reputation.65 
57 Parachutes v Para-Equipment Ltd v Broadcasting Corporation of NZ unreported (6 August 
1985) High Court, Wellington Registry, A 205/83 (per Ongley J) . 
58Comalco, above n 55,351 (per Pincus J). 
59South Hetton Coal, above n 16. 
60Derbyshire, above n 45,547. 
61See Biospherics v Forbes (1997) 989 F Supp 748 (CA). See also Attanasio, above n 8, 
1164. 
62This point is unresolved in New Zealand law. In Ti Leaf Productions v Baikie a company 
claimed punitive damages but abandonned this claim during the proceeding (HC, Timaru, CP 
7 /97) Amended Statement of Claim, para 14 U udgment forthcoming) [Ti Leaf]. 
63Television New Zealand v Quinn (1996] 3 NZLR 24, 56 (CA, per McGechan J) [Quinn]. 
64Quinn, above n 63, 56. (CA, per McGechan J). 
65Lange v Atkinson (1998] 3 NZLR 424,468 (CA, per Blanchard J). 
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In light of these considerations, the Bill of Rights has been held not to impact 
on the rights of corporate defamation plaintiffs.66 This conclusion is 
questionable in light of Derbyshire67 
III SPECIFIC CATEGORIES OF CORPORATE PLAINTIFFS 
As Rabie ACJ observes in Dhlomo No v Natal Newspapers, some categories 
of body corporate "may, in certain circumstances, be denied the right to sue on 
the ground of considerations of legal or public policy" _68 Any right of a body 
corporate to sue in defamation is an extension of the "earlier law which 
conferred such a right only on natural persons" .69 Such extension necessarily 
requires consideration of policy. 
The drafting process which Jed to section 6 of the Defamation Act considered 
only the effect of the provision on companies, and not how it would impact on 
other bodies corporate.7° This assumption of uniformity among bodies 
corporate ignores the significant policy differences between organisations such 
as public authorities, trade unions, and churches. The position of each 
category of potential corporate plaintiff must be considered independently. 
While the ultimate conclusion of this paper is that a rule is needed which 
treats all corporate plaintiffs alike, this conclusion must be justified in 
different ways in relation to different categories of party. This part considers 
the specific position of each category of corporate plaintiff, and concludes that 
corporate defamation actions are undesirable and largely unnecessary in 
relation to each. 
A Public Authorities 
1 Nature of 'public authorities' 
An analysis of the rights of a public auth01ity must first establish the scope of 
its subject. Much of the case law on this point has been concerned with local 
66NZAPMB, above n 46, 14-17. 
67See below at Parts III A 3 and IV C. 
68Natal Newspapers, above n 13, 954. 
69Natal Newspapers, above n 13, 953. 
70McKay Committee, above n 23, paras 359-363. 
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authorities.7 1 However, there appears to be no legitimate distinction between 
local authorities and other agencies of government having corporate 
personality, such as public sector ministries and departments.72 While a 
distinction may be drawn between democratically elected bodies and 
appointed bodies,73 this incorrectly ignores the point that corporate defamation 
is concerned with the reputation of the corporate entity rather than its 
members. Whether a body corporate's membership is elected or appointed 
does not alter its corporate standing. 
Arguably more valid is a distinction between the public and private functions 
of a public authority. A local authority exercises public power over a region, 
but also exercises ordinary commercial functions, such as borrowing money 
and employing staff.74 This divergence of powers should not legitimise a 
distinction between the right to suit in respect of the character of particular 
functions. While a public authority is acting commercially in borrowing 
money and hiring staff, these actions are performed in pursuance of an overall 
public function. 75 It is artificial to distinguish between commercial and public 
actions: most public actions are the aggregation of a series of commercial 
actions. The standing of public authorities as defamation plaintiffs should 
consider a11 publicly funded state agencies.76 
2 Relevant considerations 
"It is of the highest public importance that ... any governmental body should 
be open to uninhibited public criticism".77 The threat of defamation action in 
respect of criticism of a public authority would "place an undesirable fetter on 
freedom of speech" .78 Such actions would impede a crucial control against 
71 Derbyshire, above n 45. Bognar Regis, above n 9. Ballina, above n 45. 
72Derbyshire, above n 45, 548-549 (per Lord Keith). 
73N7APMB, above n 46, 10. 
74Derbyshire, above n 45,547. 
75 City of Chicago v Tribune (1923) 139 NE 86, 90 (SC Illonois, per Thompson CJ) 
[Chicago]. 
76This definition includes all public sector agencies and local authorities. SOE's and LATE's 
are excluded as they do not receive public funding and are instead considered as companies. 
Private organisations performing public functions on contract (eg Barnadoes) are excluded, as 
they are not state agencies. 
77 Derbyshire, above n 45,547. 
78 Dervyshire, above n 45, 549. See also Chicago, above n 75, 90: "While in the early history 
of the struggle for freedom of speech the restrictions were enforced by criminal prosecutions, 
it is clear that a civil action is as great, if not a greater, restriction on freedom of expression" . 
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"inefficient and corrupt government" _79 The existence of this 'chilling effect' 
has been empirically supported in relation to defamation generally.so There is 
an allied objection to the use of "the wealth of the state, derived from the 
state's subjects ... to launch actions against those subjects for defamation".81 
Further, "the normal means by which the Crown protects itself against itself 
against attacks on its management of the country's affairs is political action 
and not litigation".82 Public authorities have access to numerous mechanisms 
to defend themselves. Public authorities, or their responsible minister, may 
conduct investigations, issue official statements to the media, make statements 
protected by absolute Parliamentary privilege, or even pass legislation.83 In 
light of these uniquely public abilities, it is both undesirable and unnecessary 
to extend to public authorities "a remedy originally designed for use by private 
individuals". s4 
The absence of a need for public authority defamation actions is underscored 
by the availability of individual actions. In Derbyshire, Lord Keith observes 
that the public reputation of elected bodies is more likely to attach to the 
governing political party, and that in respect of both elected and appointed 
public authorities a "publication attacking the activities of the authority will 
necessarily be an attack on the body of councilors which represents the 
controlling party, or on the executives who can-y on the day to day 
management of its affairs".85 Actions by a body corporate are, in reality, 
actions by its officers. Criticism of the body's actions necessarily reflects on 
those officers. 86 
79Chicago, above n 75, 91. 
SOE Barendt, L Lustgarten, K Norrie and H Stephenson Libel and the Media (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1997) 191 [Barendt] . Conclusions supported by written comments 
to author by Bill Ralston (editor of Metro) [Ralston], Phil Wallington (executive producer of 
Assignment) [Wallington], and an anonymous print editor [Editor] . 
S1Die Spoorbond v South African Railways [1946) AD 999, 1013 (Appellate Division, per 
Schreiner JA) [Die Spoorbo11d]. See also E Grant & JG Small "Derbyshire County Council v 
Times Newspapers in the House of Lords: Molecular rather than Molar Motion" (1994) 14 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 287,289 [Grant & Small]. 
S2Die Spoorbond, above n 81, 1013. 
83See Ballina, above n 45, 707 (per Kirby P). See also Argus, above n 44, 598 (per Grosskopf 
JA) 
84Grant & Small, above n 81,289. 
85Derbyshire, above n 45,550. 
86Hill, Edgar, Christie & Johnson v Taylor unreported (25 November 1983) 4-5 (NSWSC, 
per David Hunt J) [Hill]. 
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Defamation claims by public authorities are not wholly insupportable on 
policy grounds. A public authority may have both a governing and a trading 
reputation. Harm to the trading reputation may make it difficult to borrow 
money or tender for contracts, may harrn staff morale, or deter participation in 
the activities it conducts.87 Despite this, defamation is not necessarily the 
appropriate avenue for redress, a distinction between trading and governing 
reputations is artificial, and the factors against a right of action strongly 
outweigh the potential for harrn. 
3 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
While the Bill of Rights is relevant to consideration of public authority 
defamation actions, the common law has not given full consideration to its 
effect.88 Any defamation action limits freedom of expression, and so breaches 
the right to free expression in section 14. The issue is whether this limitation 
is permissible under section 5, which provides that freedoms may be subject to 
"such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a 
free and democratic society". The right of public bodies to sue in defamation 
is "prescribed by law", either because section 6 of the Defamation Act creates 
a right of action, or because a right of action exists at common law.89 
In the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, the phrase "necessary in a democratic society" is used 
in place of "demonstrably justifiable in a free and democratic society", and has 
been held to require the existence of a pressing social need.90 In Derbyshire, 
Lord Keith suggests, and the Court of Appeal held, that public authority 
defamation actions were not a necessary limit on freedom of speech in a 
democratic society,91 despite the protection the Convention affords protection 
of reputation.92 
87See arguments by counsel for the plaintiff in Derbyshire, above n 45,537. 
881n N7APMB, above n 46, 17, M Thomson held that the effect of the Bill of Rights was 
outside the ambit of a strike-out application. 
89see Quinn, above n 63, 56 (CA, per McGechan J): common law prescription comes within 
the ambit of s 5. 
90Lingens v Austria (1986) 8 EHRR 407,418 (ECHR). 
9l Derbyshire, above n 45, 551. [ 1992] l QB 770, 817 (CA per Balcombe LJ). 
92 Article 10(2) European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms 1953. 
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In New Zealand, Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review sets out the 
considerations necessary to a determination of whether a limitation on a right 
is demonstrably justified.93 First, the means by which the limitation achieves 
its objective must be in reasonable proportion to the importance of the 
objective. Secondly, there must be a rational relationship between the means 
and the objective. Thirdly, there must be as little interference as possible with 
the affected freedom. Finally, the limitation must be justifiable in light of the 
objective. These considerations will inevitably interrelate. 
The limitation on freedom of speech prescribed by the right of public 
authorities to sue in defamation cannot be demonstrably justified. Its objective 
is the protection of property interests attaching to corporate reputation,94 and 
protection of officers' reputations. Defamation law properly concerns the 
protection of reputation, rather than attendant property rights. The objective of 
a public authority defamation action does not properly accord with this 
reputational basis of defamation law. As such, the limitation is not rationally 
related to its objective, and cannot be demonstrably justified. 
Moreover, the subject matter of public authority defamation actions lies more 
properly within other areas of legal protection. The reputations of officers are 
better protected by personal defamation actions, and corporate property rights 
are better protected by the torts discussed in Part VI. Allowing public 
authority defamation suits would provide more protection than is necessary. 
As such, public authority defamation actions create greater interference with 
free speech than is required to achieve their objective, and so cannot be 
demonstrably justified. 
The conclusion that public authority defamation actions impose an 
unjustifiable limitation on free speech is supported by comments of Article 
19,95 which states that "[d]efamation laws ... cannot be justified on the basis 
that they serve to protect interests other than reputation, where those interests, 
even if they may justify certain restrictions on freedom of expression, are 
better served by laws specifically designed by that purpose".96 As discussed, 
93 (1999) 5 HRNZ 224, 234 (CA, per Tipping J) [Moonen]. 
94See Martin Marietta v Evening Star Newspaper (1976) 417 F Supp 947, 955 (DC, per 
Flannery J) [Martin Marietta]. 
95 Article 19 is a London based 'Global Campaign for Free Expression', and is funded by 
UNESCO. 
96Article 19, Defining Defamation: Principles 011 Freedom of Expression and Protection of 
Reputation (London, 2000) Principle 2(c) [Article 19]. 
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public authority defamation actions protect non-reputational interests which 
are more properly protected through alternative causes of action. 
Thus public authorities are prevented from bringing corporate defamation 
actions, as this would be an act done by a branch of government which was 
inconsistent with the Bill of Rights. This means that no public authority has 
the right to bring defamation proceedings,97 and that any attempt to bring 
proceedings exposes the Crown to potential liability for Baigent's Case98 
damages. 
B Companies 
1 The New Zealand context 
Companies in New Zealand are incorporated under the Companies Act 1993. 
Section 15 of the Act provides that "a company is a legal entity in its own 
right separate from its shareholders". Section 16(1) provides that subject to the 
Companies Act, other legislation, and the general law, a company has full 
capacity to carry on or undertake any business or activity, do any act, or enter 
into any transaction; and has, for those purposes, full rights, powers, and 
privileges. These sections give a company corporate personality upon 
incorporation, and give it the power to bring legal proceedings. 
New Zealand companies are predominantly small. 86% of the 200,000 
registered companies have only one or two members, and 95% have less than 
five members. There are only around 160 publicly listed companies.99 
Contrary to approaches taken in some jurisdictions, notably the US, there is no 
legal distinction between small and large companies. 10° For this reason, it is 
necessary to closely scrutinise Anglo-American perspectives to assess their 
relevancy to the New Zealand environment. 
97M Thomson's refusal to strike out defamation proceedings brought by the New Zealand 
Apple and Pear Marketing Board on Bill of Rights grounds can be attributed to insufficient 
evidence that the Board was a public authority, and determination that the application of the 
Bill of Rights raised issues outside the ambit of a strike out application: NZAPMB, above n 46, 
11, 17. 
98Simpson v Attorney-General [1994] 3 NZLR 667 (CA). 
99R Dugan, P McKenzie and D Patterson Closely Held Companies: Legal and Tax Issues 
(CCH New Zealand, Auckland, 2000), 3 [Dugan]. 
JOOR Dugan Companies Act 1993: Governance Issues for Closely Held Companies (VUWLR, 
Wellington, 1997) 26. 
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2 Relevant considerations 
Redlich sets out a series of injuries which a company could suffer as a result 
of a defamatory statement. IOI There may be Joss of employees, impaired 
ability to recruit new staff, diminished sales, lost or compromised business 
relations or potential transactions, increased governmental scrutiny or 
regulation, diminished market capitalisation, and impaired access to debt 
markets. In Ti Leaf, the plaintiff company alleged loss arising from withdrawn 
financial backing for a film it was producing, from the abandonment of the 
film project, wasted expenditure on the film, and costs involved in responding 
to allegations. 102 However, a company "has no personality, no dignity that can 
be assailed, no feelings that can be touched. Since it cannot suffer physical 
pain, worry, or distress, it cannot lie awake nights brooding about a 
defamatory article" .103 A corporate right to bring defamation proceedings is a 
commercial right to protect corporate property rights and interests, rather than 
a human right.104 
The traditional objection to companies suing in defamation is that they may be 
powerful entities. This power manifests itself in two ways. First, companies 
may exhibit a great deal of social power. Companies and government have 
been said to be "in a state of mutual co-operation",105 resulting in an 
aggregation of social power in private companies. This power in society is 
reinforced by the potential for companies to directly impact on the Jives of its 
employees, suppliers, customers, and competitors. It has been suggested that 
major corporations are a "system of private government",106 in light of the 
impact of their actions on employment, welfare, and well-being in the 
communities in which they operate. To the extent that companies exercise 
these quasi-governmental powers, it is undesirable that they can bring 
defamation proceedings. For the reasons set out in relation to public 
authorities, io7 unfettered criticism of the exercise of such power is socially 
JOIN Redlich "The Publicly Held Company as Defamation Plaintiff' (1995) St Louis ULJ 
1167, 1168-69 [Redlich]. 
l02Ti Leaf, above n 62, Amended Statement of Claim, para 6. 
I03pN Fetzer "The Corporate Defamation Plaintiff as First Amendment Public Figure': 
Nailing the Jellyfish" (1982) 68 Iowa LR 35, 52 [Fetzer]. 
104Martin Marietta, above n 94,955. 
105Note "Libel and the Corporate Plaintiff' (1969) 69 Columbia LR 1496, 1506 [Libel and the 
Corporate Plaintiff] . 
106Libel and the Corporate Plaintiff, above n 105, 1507. 
I 07 Above Parts III A 2 and III A 3. 
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desirable, 108 particularly since corporate exercise of social power is not subject 
to effective popular restraint: corporate management is not popularly elected 
and dispersion of stock holding limits shareholder power.109 
Secondly, it is argued that companies have significant resources with which to 
counter criticism. 11 0 Non-litigation responses are more readily available to the 
defamed company, which may employ news reports or advertising to rebut 
defamatory remarks. In ABC v Comalco, Comalco produced two films m 
response to claims made on ABC's Four Corners programme, at a cost of 
A$45,000. 111 Moreover, a company's resources enable the vigorous pursuit of 
litigated remedies unrestricted by the concern about legal costs which 
confronts individual plaintiffs and some defendants. 112 It is conceivable that a 
company might willingly incur legal fees in excess of their anticipated 
damages recovery to deter potential critics. Such deterrence appears to be 
driving the English McLibel litigation. McDonald's will have invested millions 
of pounds in legal fees, and any damages award will be unrecoverable by 
reason of the defendants' inevitable bankruptcy. McDonald's is using its 
economic power to influence the course of public debate, continuing an 
apparent policy of suppression. 11 3 To the extent that the behaviour evidenced 
by Comalco and McDonald's is representative, companies have a diminished 
need for defamation proceedings, and are potentially oppressive in their 
conduct of such proceedings. 
These arguments against company defamation actions, premised on the 
economic power of the company, are subject to two criticisms. First, the 
implication that legal rights are economically contingent is an unappealing 
notion. An argument that a rich individual could not bring a defamation action 
because of their wealth would be difficult to justify. 114 However, this is a false 
l08Reliance Insurance v Barron's (1977) 442 F Supp 1341, 1347-1348 (SDNY, per Brieant 
J). 
109Libel and the Corporate Plaintiff, above n 105, 1507. 
11 O Attanasio, above n 8, 1164. 
111 Coma/co, above n 55, 350. 
112Attanasio, above n 8, 1164. 
11 3See Nicholson, above n 12, 2. McDonald's is reported to have "forced apologies or 
retractions from the BBC, The Guardian, and the Scottish TUC, effectively closed down the 
Transnational Information Centre, stopped the transmission of at least one [TV] film, and 
silenced a play." 
114American restrictions on defamation actions by public figures are imposed because of the 
need for unfettered public discussion on matters of public interest (New York Times v Sullivan 
(1964) 376 US 254 [Sullivan]). The economic power of the plaintiff is irrelevant to the ability 
to bring defamation proceedings. 
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analogy. Company defamation claims protect property rights, whereas 
individual claims protect the human right of reputation. The question of 
whether a company can bring defamation proceedings is whether such 
proceedings are a socially justifiable restriction on freedom of expression. In 
light of the potential for companies to protect their property rights through 
injurious falsehood or Fair Trading Act actions, 11 s the need for defamation 
actions is questionable. 
Secondly, a power analysis ignores the predominance of small companies in 
New Zealand. An approach premised on companies such as General Motors 
and McDonald's cannot be assumed to be valid in relation to a corner dairy. 
However, where a small company is the subject of defamatory allegations, this 
will "often involve by necessary inference imputations against those who are 
responsible for its direction and control" .11 6 Neill and Rampton suggest an 
increasing pattern of defamation actions being brought by company directors 
in parallel to a corporate action. 117 In respect of companies where the power 
analysis is an invalid criticism of a corporate right to sue in defamation, the 
right to corporate action may be unnecessary. 
Denial of defamation actions by companies is further justified on a theory of 
voluntary incorporation, which applies with equal weight regardless of 
company size. Traders are not compelled to incorporate, rather the decision is 
made in light of the perceived advantages of such incorporation such as 
preferential tax treatment and limitation of personal liability. 11 8 These 
advantages have commensurate costs. The US Supreme Court has held that a 
company "by its special nature and voluntary existence, may open itself to 
intrusions that would not be permissible in a purely private context". 119 An 
extension of this argument is the contention that a company is a franchise of 
the state in which the public have a legitimate interest. 120 On this theory, 
denial of company defamation actions is justifiable as being in the public 
115See below Part VI A. 
11 6HL Bolton (Engineering) Co Ltd v TJ Graham & Sons Ltd [1957] l QB 159, 172-173 (CA 
per Denning LJ) [Bolton]; Tesco Supermarkets v Natrass [1972) AC 153, 170-171 (HL, per 
Lord Reid) [Tesco]. See also B Neill and R Rampton Duncan and Neill on Defamation (2ed, 
Butterworths, London, 1983) 44 [Duncan & Neill]. Hill, above n 86, 4-5. 
117 Duncan & Neill, above n 116, 44-45. 
I 18DE Lee "Public Interest, Public Figures, and the Corporate Defamation Plaintiff: Jadwin v 
Minneapolis Star & Tribune (1987) 81 NW UL Rev 318, 332. 
11 9GM Leasing v United States (1977) 429 US 338, 353. (Blackmun J). 
120NE Moll "In Search of the Corporate Private Figure: Defamation of the Corporation" 
(1978) 6 Hoftsra LR 334, 354. 
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interest, and as one of the costs incurred m obtaining the advantages of 
incorporation. 
3 Common law developments 
Following Derbyshire, Patfield suggested that the case "laid the foundation for 
the future circumscription of the right to sue for defamation in a much wider 
class of cases", 121 possibly including companies. In Steel v McDonald's the 
English Court of Appeal refused to extend Derbyshire to apply to companies, 
or to any particular category of companies (such as multinationals). 122 The 
Court accepted McDonald's argument that there was "a clear distinction 
between bodies which exist to serve the public interest only and a trading 
corporation which exists for the benefit of its shareholders and whose 
commercial success affects its employees, suppliers, customers, creditors and 
trading partners". 
The decision in McDonald's is open to criticism. The distinction between 
public and private organisations is primarily based on the interests of third 
parties in relation to those bodies. Third party interests are a questionable 
consideration in defamation law, which exists to protect the interests of the 
plaintiff. 123 The Court of Appeal also found itself bound by obi ter statements 
by Lord Keith in Derbyshire that trading corporations had a right of action in 
defamation. The outcome may also be coloured by the fact that the appellants 
appeared in person, raising doubts as to the quality of their argumentation. 
McDonald's does not pose an insurmountable barrier to the extension of 
Derbyshire to companies. 
C Political Parties 
1 Political parties in New Zealand 
Evaluation of political parties' ability to bring defamation proceedings has 
been impeded by some uncertainty over which bodies may be so described. 124 
121 F Patfield "Defamation, Freedom of Speech and Corporations" [ 1993] Juridical Review 
294 [Patfield (1993)]. 
122Above n 11, Part 3. 
123See above Part III A 3. 
124Argus, above n 44, 585-586. 
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This analytical barrier is avoided in New Zealand, where the concept 'political 
party' may be defined as a political party registered under the Electoral Act 
1993. The concept incorporates Parliamentary parties such as National, 
Labour, and ACT, and non-Parliamentary parties such as Animals First and 
Mauri Pacific. The ability to sue depends on a party taking a structure giving it 
corporate personality. The Electoral Act 1993 does not require that parties do 
this. 
2 Relevant Considerations 
A defamatory statement may harm a political party by reducing its electoral 
support, by impeding the exercise of elected powers, by discouraging donors 
from providing financial support, and by discouraging membership. It is 
doubtful that diminished electoral support and difficulties in the exercise of 
power would be recoverable. Such harm is incapable of pecuniary expression. 
The fundamental objection to defamation suits by political parties is that 
political debate should be free and unrestricted. It has been observed that 
"criticism of the ideals and policies and conduct of political parties is vital to 
the interests of democracy." 12s This interest is manifested in New Zealand by 
the recent limitations placed on defamation actions by individual political 
figures, based on the public interest in being informed about the qualities of 
political leaders.126 This rationale is equally applicable to political parties. 
Defamation actions at the suit of political parties would fetter such criticism 
by discouraging potential critics of political parties from expressing their 
criticism and by indicating the party's intention to anyone making similar 
criticisms. 
Attendant to this objection is the view that political parties should protect their 
reputations in a political, rather than legal forum. Political parties have greater 
access to channels of communication than private individuals. Requirements 
of balance in broadcast news 121 create a de facto right of reply in respect of 
criticism of political parties in this arena. Political parties operate in a political 
system which allows access to the media through publicly funded electoral 
broadcasts, contact with the Parliamentary Press Gallery, and the ability to 
l25Healy, above n 44,440. 
l26Lange 2000, above n 38, para 33. 
127Broadcasting Standards Authority Free-to-Air Television Programme Code, Standard G6. 
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make press releases directly to media outlets. Moreover, many political parties 
retain in-house press officers, with some also using external public relations 
consultants. Individual members may also be able to sue in protection of their 
own reputations. 
There is no New Zealand authority on the availability of defamation suits for 
political parties, but such actions have been viewed with disfavour elsewhere. 
In New South Wales, it has been clear that the "common law does not give a 
right of action to a political party claiming to be defamed" 128 on the grounds of 
the need for free political debate. In the United Kingdom, the Derbyshire bar 
on local authority defamation actions has been extended to political parties. 129 
Going against these authorities is the approach of the South African Appellate 
Di vision in Argus Printing and Publishing v Inkatha Freedom Party. 130 In that 
case the Inkatha Freedom Party was allowed to bring defamation proceedings. 
The unanimous decision of the Court was based on the view that defamation 
law contained internal controls to prevent oppressive use of defamation 
proceedings by political parties. It was held that free speech was sufficiently 
protected by the likelihood that a jury would incline against finding statements 
made in a political context defamatory, the availability of the defences of fair 
comment, justification, and qualified privilege, and the discretion of the Court 
in awarding damages. 
This approach is of limited applicability outside South Africa. The Court held 
that it was impossible to draw a distinction which enabled specific 
consideration of the position of political parties, but rather considered the 
position of all bodies participating in political debate or attempting to 
influence government policy. Drawing on evidence from the then recent 
Constitutional referendum, this class was taken to include such organizations 
as private corporations, cultural organizations, sports clubs, and civic 
associations, in addition to political parties. 131 This analysis cannot be 
supported in New Zealand. In the relatively settled New Zealand political 
system, the number and breadth of bodies making public political statements 
is far smaller. Crucially, the Electoral Act allows precise definition of what 
constitutes a political party. 
128Healy , above n 44,440. 
I 29Goldsmith, above n 44, 270. 
130Argus, above n 44, 587-591. 
131Argus, above n 44,586. 
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The substantive reasoning is also questionable. It is doubtful that defamation 
law contains sufficient safeguards to protect free speech. The Court's approach 
is premised on the assumption that a critic will be undeterred by potential 
defamation actions in which they will certainly prevail. This premise is based 
on the incorrect assumption that a successful defamation defendant incurs no 
disadvantage from the proceeding. Regardless of a costs award, a successful 
defendant will incur some degree of legal expense in rebutting the plaintiff's 
case and in making out the positive defences referred to by the Court. Further, 
the proceedings will impose secondary costs on the defendant, such as 
inconvenience, lost work time, and the disruption of discovery. A potential 
critic, confronted by a choice between suppressing their criticism or exposing 
themselves to these negative impacts, may incline towards silence. 
Defamation actions by political parties are difficult to justify. They have the 
potential to fetter free speech at elections, when free speech is most important, 
and are rendered virtually unnecessary by the availability of alternative 
responses to potentially defamatory statements. 
D Trade Unions 
Trade unions m New Zealand must be registered under the Employment 
Relations Act 2000, which requires unions to be incorporated societies. 132 
This gives unions procedural standing to sue. 
A defamatory statement may harm a union by deterring members, by reducing 
donations, or by impeding its ability to lobby government effectively. In 
Gillian 's Case 133 the plaintiff union disintegrated as a result of a defamatory 
statement. Courts according the right of suit to unions have been concerned to 
protect their effectiveness in the collective bargaining process. A union "must 
be able to protect itself against any form of attack calculated to arouse doubts 
and suspicions in the minds of members, and so destroy the cohesion and will 
to act of the union." 134 Without the right to bring a defamation action, an 
employer might cast aspersions on his employees' union to discourage 
membership: for the employer, individual contract negotiations will often be 
I32Employment Relations Act 2000, s 14(l)(b) [ERA]. 
l33Gillian, above n 41, 87 (per Scott LJ). 
I34Gillian, above n 41, 86 (per Scott LJ). 
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preferable to collective bargaining. The potential for such 'union-busting' is 
greater in New Zealand than it was in England at the time of Gillian 's Case, as 
union membership is voluntary. 
Unions have significant powers. They can call strikesI35 and potentially 
cripple industries. They can enter private premises to recruit members.136 
Unions also comment publicly on a wide range of issues, and through the 
practice of endorsing parties prior to elections, exercise considerable influence 
over the character of government. While judges have tended to describe 
unions as quasi-corporations, 137 this is an assessment of structure rather than 
substance. Unions are better analogised as quasi political parties. The 
considerations which militate against political parties suing in defamation also 
apply to trade unions. Unions are participants in public policy debate, and 
there is a public interest in that debate being unfettered. Moreover, the power 
of unions to unilaterally declare strikes creates a legitimate public interest in 
the manner in which they conduct their affairs. 
The necessity of defamation actions by unions is questionable. Whereas a 
company may be said to have a corporate persona and perform some actions 
which cannot be linked to any identifiable person, unions are accumulations of 
individuals. Union actions, such as the conduct of internal voting, public 
statements on various issues, and the conduct of contract negotiations, are 
carried out by identifiable individuals. There is little corporate persona distinct 
from the membership. This has two consequences. Few statements will 
defame the union, as distinct from its members, such as would give rise to a 
defamation action brought by the corporate union. Secondly, any statement 
regarding a union action will inevitably reflect on individuals within the 
union, and so be capable of remedy through individual defamation 
proceedings. 
On balance, the policy considerations relevant to umon defamation actions 
militate strongly against allowing such actions. 
135ERA, ss 83-84. 
136ERA, s 20. 
l37Gillian, above n 41, 88 (per Uthwatt J). 
27 
E Churches 
Churches are free to assume any corporate structure. Commonly churches will 
be incorporated societies: the New Zealand Catholic church is legally the 
Society of Mary. Churches may also operate as companies, with Scientology 
being the leading example of this structure. Defamatory statements are capable 
of causing pecuniary harm to churches. Donations may be reduced, 
recruitment of clergy and congregation may be impaired, and commercial 
ventures conducted by the church may be impeded. 
Only a narrow category of statements are capable of defaming a church. 
Commonly, religious criticism is aimed at 'Jews' or 'Catholics' generally. Such 
statements may defame individuals if, by their context, they identify a 
particular person. However, the church itself is not directly defamed. 
Similarly, statements directed against a member of the clergy will not be 
actionable at the suit of the church. An allegation that "Father X is a child 
molester" does not defame the church as a corporate entity. An allegation of 
corrupt administration within a church may be capable of defaming the 
church, as might strong criticism of the doctrines of the church. In relation to 
an allegation of corruption, a church's position is no different to any secular 
body corporate. Such statements relate to commercial administration, and this 
facet of a church's functions is indistinct from commercial administration 
within a company. The policy against allowing companies to bring defamation 
actions also militates against allowing churches to bring defamation actions. 
Doctrinal criticism will rarely be capable of a defamatory meaning. The 
inherent subjectivity of doctrinal debate renders it unlikely to be found 
objectively defamatory. A statement which misrepresents a church's doctrinal 
position could be defamatory: A statement that "church X advocates genocide" 
would be defamatory of the church as a corporate body. 
Defamation of churches is, in part, a human rights issue. The reported cases do 
not address this point, probably because most are brought by the Church of 
Scientology, and there appears to be a judicial view that Scientology is not a 
'real' religion.138 The right to freedom of religion is reflected by section 13 of 
the Bill of Rights and section 2l(l)(c) of the Human Rights Act 1993. A 
defamation action brought by a church seeks to protect this human right. 
I 38see Readers Digest, above n 40. Anderson, above n 40. 
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Limitation of the right to free express10n 1s easier to justify when this 
limitation protects another human right than when it protects property rights. 
Conversely there is a public interest in free debate about churches. By their 
nature they exercise significant power over classes of people. There is some 
benefit in allowing those outside the church to scrutinise its merits. This is 
particularly so where adherents accept church control unquestioningly. 
Churches also occupy a powerful position in society through their ability to 
guide the conduct of members. The direct political pressure of the Hikoi of 
Hope in respect of social policy, and the Catholic position on contraception 
exemplify this social power. Free speech is the means by which the population 
exercise control over such aggregation of social power, and should not be 
lightly discarded, even in the case of churches. 
F Charities 
Again, the starting point for analysis must be the procedural consideration of 
corporate personality. Preferential taxation treatment means that charities will 
almost certainly be structured as charitable trusts, and able to sue in the name 
of the trust. 
Charities may be divided into religious and non-religious organisations. 
Groups such as the Salvation Almy, World Vision, Christian Children's' Fund, 
and Presbyterian Social Services exist as extensions of churches. It is illogical 
to distinguish between these organisations and other elements of churches' 
ministries. Therefore the arguments canvassed in relation to churches' ability 
to sue in defamation are applicable to such groups. 
Not all charities are affiliated to churches. Groups such as Pub Charity, 
Bamadoes and CCS are stand-alone organisations and are capable of suffering 
pecuniary loss sufficient to satisfy section 6 of the Defamation Act. A 
defamatory statement may "discourage subscribers or otherwise impair [the 
charity's] ability to carry on its charitable objects". 139 Such organisations may 
be perceived as acting in the public interest and deserving of the protection 
afforded by defamation law. However, this must be weighed against the public 
interest in ensuring debate and scrutiny of such organisations. Charitable 
status affords an organisation a uniquely favourable taxation regime. A failure 
l39Derbyshire, above n 45,547. 
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by a charity to comply with the terms of its trust deed amounts to tax evasion. 
Such failures may include trustee self-interest, illegitimate considerations in 
the distribution of payments, or otherwise corrupt administration. There is a 
public interest in ventilating these failures, particularly given the practical 
inability of IRD to fully monitor compliance and the public harm resulting 
from non-compliance. This is exacerbated by the absence of public reporting 
requirements for charities. Moreover, in light of the dependence of weak 
members of society on charities, there is also a public interest in ensuring that 
they conduct their activities in an appropriate manner. 
While there may be an unwillingness to deprive charities of legal protection, 
the public interest in free debate regarding their activities does not allow a 
distinction to be drawn between them and other bodies corporate in relation to 
the ability to sue in defamation. As with other bodies corporate, charities may 
respond to criticism in ways other than corporate defamation actions. On 
balance, policy militates against allowing charities to bring corporate 
defamation actions. 
G Clubs and Associations 
Many social groupings are structured as bodies corporate. Sporting clubs, 
chartered clubs, and professional associations such as law societies, may all 
seek the advantages which arise from corporate personality, such as 
transactional convenience and possibly preferential taxation. Such groups may 
take the form of incorporated societies, trusts, or companies. Where a club or 
association takes a non-corporate form, such as an unincorporated society or a 
simple grouping of individuals, it will lack the personality to bring legal 
proceedings, and so fall outside the scope of this paper. 
Where clubs and associations are operated on a profit basis, their position is 
practically analogous to that of a company, and the policy against allowing 
companies to sue in defamation is directly relevant. The position is different 
where such organisations are operated on a non-profit basis. Such 
organizations are capable of suffering pecuniary harm despite their non-profit 
status. 
A non-profit organisation may take one or both of two forms. It may be a 
service provider, such as a sports club. Service providers are analogous to 
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companies, as their functions are concerned with the acquisition and 
disposition of property, 140 and their standing to sue in defamation is subject to 
similar policy considerations. Additionally, such groups may receive public 
funds to support their provision of services. To the extent that this occurs, the 
considerations relevant to public authorities are obliquely relevant. 141 
A non-profit organisation may also act as an advocate, whether for the specific 
interests of its members or for an alleged public benefit.142 Both forms of 
advocacy organisation are analogous to political parties. While advocacy 
groups do not necessarily stand in elections, they participate in political 
debate, and may have a significant influence over the direction of policy or 
electoral success. The considerations relevant to political party defamation 
actions are relevant to advocacy groups.143 There is a strong public interest in 
unfettered political debate. 
Clubs and associations may take many forms, and it is futile to anticipate the 
character of every possible group. However, it can be seen that in the exercise 
of their corporate functions, clubs and associations will tend to reflect some 
combination of the operations of companies, public authorities, and political 
bodies. It has been contended that each of these corporate forms, of 
themselves, should not be able to sue in defamation. 144 By extension, clubs 
and associations as hybrids of these forms should also be denied the right to 
sue. 
H Conclusion 
Each category of potential corporate plaintiff raises unique considerations, in 
addition to notable areas of uniformity. Overall, these considerations lead to 
the uniform conclusion that defamation actions by bodies corporate are 
harmful to public debate and frequently unnecessary. 
This conclusion is weakest in relation to churches and charities. However, 
actions by such plaintiffs remain undesirable. First, the right to sue can be 
140Chinese Empire, above n 43, 142-143. Natal Newspapers, above n 13,955. 
141 See above Part III A 2. 
142While groups advocating the interests of their membership will commonly claim to be 
acting in the public interest, there is a clear distinction between self-interested groups, such as 
the Business Roundtable, and publically interested groups, such as Greenpeace. 
143See above Part III B 2. 
144See above Parts III A 2, III B 2, and III C 2. 
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denied with reference to the policy canvassed as relevant to those 
organisations. Secondly, the right to sue can be denied by reference to its 
harmful secondary effects. If churches and charities were afforded the right to 
sue in defamation, this would lead to uncertainty over the line between those 
organisations and other organisations lacking standing to sue. A private 
company operating a charitable trustI4S or having religious affiliationsI46 
would have an unclear status. Such uncertainty may have a stifling effect, and 
would create anomalies in the law. While the arguments supporting the 
retention of churches' and charities' rights to sue in defamation are stronger 
than those applying to other bodies corporate, they are insufficient to outweigh 
the negative impact of such suits. 
For each category of corporate plaintiff, the right to sue in defamation is not 
indefensible. However, in relation to each category, the benefits of the right 
are outweighed by its costs. 
IV GENERAL INEFFECTIVENESS OF CORPORATE 
DEFAMATION LAW 
In addition to the category-specific considerations canvassed above, the law 
relating to corporate defamation plaintiffs raises issues which are equally 
applicable to each category of potential plaintiff. This Part discusses the over-
arching technical and policy shortcomings of corporate defamation law. 
A Technical Shortcomings 
As Hansard indicates, section 6 is intended to remove confusion over the 
heads of damage recoverable by a body corporate in a defamation action. 147 
The section fulfills this narrow function. However, the provision has the 
potential to mislead. It suggests that "bodies corporate" are to be treated 
uniformly as a class of plaintiffs. This uniform interpretation is evident in the 
only case to consider the section. In New Zealand Apple and Pear Marketing 
Board v Apple Fields, M Thomson states that the "1ight of a corporation to sue 
for damages is also recognised in the Defamation Act itself section 6 (sic). I 
observe that the McKay Report which resulted in the passing of the 
145This structure is apparent in the Mcdonald's-Ronald McDonald House linkage, and The 
Warehouse-Tindall Trust linkage. 
146This structure is apparent in the Sanatarium-Seventh Day Adventist linkage. 
147(10 November 1992) 531 NZPD 12144. 
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Defamation Act 1992 made no distinction between bodies corporate".148 By 
treating all bodies corporate alike in relation to the damage threshold, section 
6 indicates that they are to be treated alike in relation to corporate defamation 
law generally. 
This uniformity of treatment is problematic in relation to both the damage 
threshold and the overall rule. The pecuniary damage threshold creates 
evidentiary difficulty for non-profit organizations, for which pecuniary loss 
may be indirect and delayed. 149 The damage threshold was drafted with 
companies in mind, 150 and is not wholly suitable to the other corporate 
structures to which it applies. By treating all corporate plaintiffs alike, section 
6 is capable of being interpreted as meaning that policy is irrelevant to the 
determination of whether a particular class of corporate plaintiffs should be 
allowed to sue. This conclusion is contrary to precedent and logic. 151 
In drafting the Defamation Act, the legislature had the opportunity to 
undertake an holistic reform of the law relating to corporate defamation 
plaintiffs. In preferring to draft a partial rule clarifying a single point, the 
legislature missed this opportunity, and created the potential for confusion. 
B Chilling Effect 
The present hybrid of statute and common law which constitutes New 
Zealand's corporate defamation law creates a significant risk of the so-called 
'chilling effect'. This existence of this effect has been empirically 
demonstrated in the United Kingdom. "[T]he chilling effect genuinely does 
exist and significantly restricts what the public is able to read and hear." 152 
Defamation law also has a constant and restrictive effect in the New Zealand 
media. 153 
Neither section 6 nor the common law gives sufficient attention to the public 
interest in allowing c1iticism of bodies corporate. Section 6 is concerned 
solely with the technical legal question of the forms of loss which a body 
148Above n 46, 10. 
149J Burrows and U Cheer Media Law in New Zealand (4ed, Oxford University Press, 1999) 
40 n 235. 
150McKay Committee, above n 23, paras 359-363. 
151 See Derbyshire, above n 45. Natal Newspapers, above n 13 . 
l 52Barendt, above n 80, 191. 
153Ralston/Wallington/Editor, above n 80. 
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corporate can suffer. At common law, no New Zealand case has attached 
weight to the public interest. The leading Commonwealth authority for public 
interest denial of corporate defamation rights is Derbyshire, in which a county 
council was prevented from suing The Times in respect of statements about 
the management of the council's superannuation fund. In New Zealand this 
case has been viewed doubtfully, and only in the context of a strike-out 
application. 154 Further, Derbyshire only applies to public authorities. Were it 
part of New Zealand's common law, it would not directly affect a large group 
of potential corporate plaintiffs.1ss 
The absence of protection of public debate in the law creates a real risk that 
corporate defamation plaintiffs may exercise excessive control over public 
debate. Provided that the damage threshold is satisfied, large corporate 
plaintiffs are able to force their critics into potentially ruinous litigation. This 
chills public debate in two ways. First, a corporate plaintiff may effectively 
silence a particular critic. In Bognar UDC v Campion, 156 the defendant was 
reported to be "tireless. And tiresome. Unquestionably he was a very great 
nuisance" .157 By bringing a defamation action the Council was able to 
bankrupt Mr Campion and effectively end his criticisms. 158 Secondly, a 
corporate plaintiff may bring a number of defamation proceedings to deter 
future critics. 159 The Church of Scientology has been a prolific defamation 
plaintiff in many jurisdictions. Because of this, potential critics of the Church 
will be aware of the likelihood that any criticism will attract defamation 
proceedings. New Zealand journalists suggest that they will be more cautious 
in their comments about a litigious subject. 160 
Current defamation law makes such conduct by corporate plaintiffs possible. 
The law contains theoretical protection for defendants, but these are 
ineffective. Where a plaintiff's claim amounts to an abuse of process, the 
proceeding may be dismissed16I and may give rise to a tortious claim by the 
154NZAPMB, above n 46, 10-11 : M Thomson observes that the Defamation Act 1992 was 
passed after the Derbyshire decision, distinguishes Derbyshire, and notes the 'compelling' 
dissent of Mahoney JA in Ballina. 
155In the UK, the Derbyshire approach has been extended to the British Coal Corporation 
(British Coal, above n 46), and to political parties (Goldsmith, above n 44). 
156Above n 9. 
157Weir, above n 5, 243. 
158Weir, above n 5, 238. 
159See above Parts III B 2 and III B 3. 
160Ralston/Wallington/Editor, above n 80. 
161 Reid v NZ Trotting Conference [1984] l NZLR 8. 
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defendant. The Defamation Act 1992 gives some recognition to the potential 
for abusive proceedings. 162 However, a defamation claim will not be an abuse 
where it is brought to vindicate the plaintiff's reputation.163 Most corporate 
actions which seek to stifle debate can be validly described as actions in 
protection of the plaintiff's reputation, and are unlikely to amount to an abuse 
of process. The practical utility of abuse of process rules in combating the 
chilling effect is questionable.164 
Defamation law also affords ostensible defendant protection through imposing 
the burden of proof on the plaintiff, and providing defences of truth, qualified 
privilege, and honest opinion. 165 These protections are also ineffective in 
countering the chilling effect. A successful defendant in a defamation 
proceedings will inevitably incur unrecoverable costs because of inadequate 
costs awards and secondary costs arising from the disruption of litigation.166 
The threat of a defamation action may deter criticism regardless of the 
likelihood of success.167 
This chilling effect is accentuated by the uncertainty of the law. Barendt's 
analysis of the chilling effect concludes that "uncertainty in both the principles 
of defamation law and their practical application induce very great caution on 
the part of the media. Virtually every interviewee, in all branches of the media, 
emphasised the lottery aspect of this area of the law." 168 The major uncertainty 
in New Zealand's corporate defamation law relates to the categories of 
corporate plaintiffs which are able to bring proceedings. It is unclear, for 
instance, whether a public body could bring an action, and further, what 
bodies fall within any bar on public body actions. The risk created by 
uncertainty is that potential critics will seek to minimise their potential 
liability by assuming that the law takes its most unfavourable form, and acting 
accordingly. A potential critic of a public body might therefore assume that 
the law allowed that body to bring a defamation action. 
162DA, ss 43, 45. 
163R v Daily Mail ( Editor): Ex parte Factor (1928) 44 TLR 303, 306 (CA, per Lord Hewart 
CJ). 
I64Gillooly, above n 32, 32. 
165See Part III C 2. 
166See Part III C 2. 
167Editor, above n 80, suggesting that some stories known to be defensible will be amended to 
avoid threatened litigation: "if the story was not overly significant but the threat was highly 
likely to be made good ... one needs to keep a perspective and know which battles are 
actually worth fighting". 
l68Barendt, above n 80, 186. 
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C Failure to Consider Freedom of Speech 
The Bill of Rights' protection of freedom of speech prevents public authorities 
from bringing defamation actions.169 However, the Bill of Rights does not 
apply directly to private bodies. Regardless of whether section 6 of the 
Defamation Act, as an act done by the legislative branch, is capable of being 
interpreted consistently with the Bill of Rights, the ability of corporate 
plaintiffs to sue in defamation arises from the common law, and so cannot be 
directly affected by the Bill of Rights. 170 However, the principles of the Bill of 
Rights may be applicable by analogy. 
Existing Commonwealth case law on corporate defamation is based on the 
perception of freedom of speech as a democratic right. This perception is 
paralleled by the structure of the Bill of Rights, which applies only to acts by 
public authorities. The cases which have denied certain bodies corporate the 
right to sue in defamation have sought to protect free speech as significant to 
the maintenance of democracy. In Derbyshire, Goldsmith, British Coal 
Corporation, Ballina Shire Council, and New South Wales Aboriginal 
Council, corporate plaintiffs were denied the right to sue m defamation 
because of the requirements of democratic govemment. 17 1 
Freedom of speech is also "a fundamental right, which in tum helps to protect 
other rights. If people can speak freely, they can assert their rights openly and 
protest any infringements." 172 Docherty identifies two grounds for this 
approach. Open discussion creates a marketplace of ideas "in which ideas 
compete in the public sphere until truth emerges." 173 Further, she argues that 
"people can only experience true autonomy and self-fulfillment if they are 
allowed to express themselves; thus free expression represents an end in 
itself." 174 
I69See above Part III A 3. 
170Elias J's suggestion in her High Court decision in Lange v Atkinson [ 1997] 2 NZLR 22, 32 
that the Bi II of Rights applied to all judicial decisions as 'acts of the judicial branch' was not 
adopted in any of the subsequent appellate decisions. 
171 B Docherty "Defamation Law: Positive Jurisprudence" (2000) 12 Harv Hum Rts J 263, 
286 [Docherty]. 
172Docherty, above n 171, 266. 
173Docherty, above n 171 , 266. 
174Docherty, above n 171 ,266. 
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To give full effect to freedom of speech, the common law should, through 
analogy, allow indirect application of Bill of Rights principles to prevent 
private bodies corporate from bringing defamation actions. Section 6 of the 
Defamation Act does not create or protect the right of private corporate bodies 
to bring defamation actions. Rather it regulates the exercise of their common 
law right of action. Thus the common law is capable of removing the rights of 
private corporate defamation plaintiffs, and should do so in protection of 
freedom of speech. This analysis is reinforced by the requirement that section 
6 be interpreted consistently with the Bill of Rights wherever possible. 175 
The present state of the law is ineffective in relation to corporate defamation 
plaintiffs as it does not adequately protect freedom of speech. This 
ineffectiveness is particularly unfortunate in light of the fact that this 
protection could be afforded within the existing legal framework. 
V POSSIBLE MODELS OF CORPORATE PLAINTIFF LAW 
A United States Approach 
1 The Constitutional model 
In the United States, the nexus between freedom of expression and defamation 
is located in three Supreme Court judgrnents. In New York Times v Sullivan, 
Brennan J, with a plurality of the Court, held that defamatory statements 
concerning public officials are only actionable where the defendant has acted 
with actual malice, in that they either knew that the statement was false, or 
were acting with reckless disregard for its truth or falsity. 176 This 
Constitutionally driven approach sterns from society's need for "uninhibited, 
robust and wide-open debate", and the acknowledgrnent that mistakes are 
inevitable in free debate. m In Curtis Publishing v Butts the Supreme Court 
extended the rule to cover public figures as well as public officials. 178 Gertz v 
Robert Welch provides for a classification of plaintiffs as private figures, 
general purpose public figures, which are considered to be public in relation to 
all of their functions, and limited purpose public figures, which are considered 
175New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 6 [BoRA]. 
176Sullivan, above n 114, 279-80 (per Brennan J). 
177Sullivan, above n 114, 279-80. 
178(1967) 388 US 130, 164 (per Warren CJ concurring). 
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to be public figures in relation to some of their functions.179 In distinguishing 
between public and private figures, the Court suggest "looking to the nature 
and extent of an individual's participation in the particular controversy giving 
rise to the defamation". 180 A plaintiff who has "thrust himself into the vortex 
of this public issue [or] engage[d] the public's attention in an attempt to 
influence its outcome" 181 is likely to be a public figure. 
The classification of a corporation under Gertz remains uncertain.1s2 The 
Courts of Appeal have generally "rejected a general rule of public figure status 
for corporations. Instead, they have interpreted Gertz as requiring a specific 
determination in each case",183 giving rise to a "myriad of approaches and 
tests". 184 
2 Advantages 
The US approach provides protection for those who participate m public 
debate. Where public figures bring a defamation action, they must discharge 
the difficult burden of proving that the defendant acted with actual malice. 
Critics generally make statements in good faith. The introduction of an actual 
malice requirement shifts the burden of proving the truth or falsity of the 
defamatory statement from the defendant to the plaintiff. This reduction in the 
defendant's evidentiary burden may reduce the chilling effect: a potential critic 
will not be deterred from making a statement by reason of the practical 
difficulties of proving its truth. Metro editor Bill Ralston advocates reform of 
New Zealand defamation law to closer reflect this US model. 185 
179Gertz, above n 2, 351-352 (Powell J giving thejudgment of the Court). 
I 80Gertz, above n 2, 352. 
18 I Gertz, above n 2, 352. 
182In Dun & Bradstreet v Green111oss Builders (1985) 472 US 749 [Dun & Bradstreet] the 
Supreme Court implcitly assumed that a corporate plaintiff was a public figure, but did not 
discuss the point. 
183LB Oberlander "Corporate Plaintiffs: Public or Private Figures" ( 1998) 16 Comm Law I at 
n 8 [Oberlander]. 
1840berlander, above n 183 at n 10, setting out tests from National Life Insurance v Phillips 
Publishing (1992) 793 F Supp 627, 634 (DC citing Fourth Circuit CA); Snead v Red/and 
Aggregates (1992) 998 F 2d 1325, 1329 (Fifth Circuit CA) [Snead]; Silvester v American 
Broadcasting Companies (1988) 839 F 2d 1491, 1494 (Eleventh Circuit CA); Waldbaum v 
Fairchild Publications (1979) 627 F 2d 1287, 1297 (DC Circuit CA). 
185Ralston, above n 80. 
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Further, by taking a case-by-case approach to determining public or private 
status, the US model broadly distinguishes between powerful corporations and 
small businesses which have chosen to incorporate. 
By analysing cases on the basis of the subject matter under debate, rather than 
the nature of the plaintiff body, the approach gives the fullest possible effect to 
freedom of speech. Companies are denied the right to sue in defamation in 
relation to matters of public interest, despite being non-governmental bodies. 
Freedom of speech is not limited to the democratic context, but is effected as a 
wider human right.1 86 
3 Disadvantages 
Four elements of the US model operate to negate much of its potential benefit. 
First, by taking a case by case approach , the model will require cases to 
proceed to a hearing to determine the status of the plaintiff. Potential critics 
will be deterred from criticism by a desire to avoid the difficulty and expense 
of arguing that a corporate plaintiff is a public figure. 
Secondly, the law is uncertain. A potential critic may be unsure of how to 
determine the status of the object of their potential criticism. As discussed187 
uncertainty in the law increases the impact of the chilling effect it that it 
causes potential critics to minimise risk by assessing their position on the 
basis of the interpretation which is most disadvantageous to them. 
Thirdly, the US Supreme Court allows corporate plaintiffs to recover 
"presumed damages" .188 These reflect the general damages available to 
individual plaintiffs in the Commonwealth as a solatium for injury to feelings . 
As Commonwealth authorities have established, it is illogical to award such 
damages to corporations, which have no non-pecuniary feelings to be hurt.1 89 
The approach may allow for artificial inflation of damages awards and 
I 86Docherty, above n 171 , 266. 
187See above Part IV B. 
188Dun & Bradstreet, above n 182, 763 (per Powell J). 
189See Coma/co, above n 55, 348 (per Pincus J). The dissent in Dun & Bradstreet recognises 
this point, above n 182, 793 nl6 (per Brennan J). 
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compensation for injuries which have never been suffered. 190 The threat of 
such inflated awards will chill public debate. 
Fourthly, the costs regime m American courts 1s ineffective. The 
Commonwealth practice of ordering the losing party to contribute to the 
winning party's legal expenses is very rarely adopted. A critic who 
successfully defends a defamation proceeding will be left with significant 
legal expenses. A resource-indifferent corporate plaintiff can use this to deter 
critics with the threat of proceedings. Further, as a defendant, the critic is 
unable to take advantage of the American contingency fee regime. The 
financial burden of legal proceedings will have a chilling effect on free 
speech. 
B Declaratory Relief 
1 The declaratory model 
A suggested reform to the law relating to corporate defamation plaintiffs is the 
"so-called 'diminished defamation' action".19 1 Hemphill argues that "a judicial 
determination of wrongful conduct by the defendant ... may seem to be a 
proper mechanism for the plaintiff to vindicate her reputation, with the added 
bonus of not chilling speech with large damage awards". 192 This model is 
based on the premise that corporate defamation actions serve two purposes: 
compensation for loss and public vindication of the body corporate. Under the 
declaratory model the public interest in free speech is relied on to justify 
requiring corporates (or their insurers) to carry the costs caused by criticism, 
but allowing vindication of their corporate name to limit those costs. 
2 Assessment 
The fundamental benefit in allowing declaratory relief to corporate defamation 
plaintiffs is the ability of such plaintiffs, through public vindication, to limit 
the harm caused by defamatory criticism. A defamatory statement about an 
organisation may have an enduring impact on the organisation if it continues 
190Aw Langvardt "A Principled Approach to Compensatory Damages in Corporate 
Defamation Cases" (1990) 27 ABU 491,492. 
191Redlich, above n 101, 1170. 
192JA Hemphill "Libel-Proof Plaintiffs and the Question of Injury" (1992) 71 Texas LR 401, 
417. 
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Trading Act.194 As will be discussed , these actions give corporate plaintiff th 
ability to sue in respect of statements made in trade such a th e made by 
trade competitors, and those made maliciously. Declaratory relief for the 
corporate defamation plaintiff would only give greater protection than these 
actions where a statement was made by a non-trade critic acting without 
malice. The public interest in freedom of expression make it doubtful that 
such critics should be impeded. 
193Article 19, above n 96, Principles 2(a)-(c). 
l 94See below Part VI A. 
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The declaratory model would impede expression by these critics. Its capacity 
to alleviate the chilling effect is limited. In the defamation action brought in 
England by Upjohn, damages of £85,000 were awarded, while legal costs were 
estimated at £2.5 million. 195 While this is an extreme example, it exemplifies 
replacing an award of damages with a declaration would not materially alter 
the influences on a potential critic of a corporation. Litigation costs, being 
both those incurred by the defendant and those incurred by the plaintiff and 
awarded against the defendant, would remain a deterrent of potentially equal 
force. Even if legal aid was available, or the corporate plaintiff paid all costs, 
the deterrent effect arising from the non-financial impositions of defending a 
defamation action would remain. The chilling effect would be substantially 
unchanged. 
Moreover, legal aid or plaintiff funding for the defendant would diminish the 
perceived legitimacy of the plaintiffs vindication. A legal aid defence, 
necessarily provided by a lawyer charging below market rates, may be 
perceived as inadequate opposition for expensive corporate counsel. Plaintiff 
funding may raise doubts regarding loyalty, and may cause ethical difficulties 
for the defence lawyer. These problems could create the impression that a 
declaration in favour of the plaintiff lacked credibility. 
Despite the apparent advantages of the declaratory model, its legitimacy, 
effectiveness and necessity as a vindication tool, are not sufficient to justify 
the imposition it places on free expression. 
C Characteristics of an Effective Model 
An effective model of corporate defamation plaintiff law will afford protection 
to freedom of expression as a democratic tight and as a broad human right. 
The protection afforded to criticism should be cast in light of the necessity and 
desirability of protecting the property interests of the relevant type of 
corporate plaintiff. 
Elimination of the chilling effect requires that protection of critics occurs at 
the initiation of proceedings, rather than during proceedings. Ideally, 
undesirable suits by corporate plaintiffs must be prevented altogether, rather 
than defeated during the course of hearing. 
I95Penzi, above n 3,223. 
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The ideal model will contain few areas of uncertainty. A potential critic 
should be capable of analysing their legal position without having to make 
worst case assumptions about the scope of defamation law. 
Corporate plaintiffs are not wholly undeserving. There will be cases where 
there is a need to compensate a corporate plaintiff for the consequences of a 
defamatory statement. An effective model will recognise this. 
VI EFFECTIVENESS OF AN ABSOLUTE BAR ON CORPORATE 
PLAINTIFFS 
The competing interests of freedom of speech and corporate reputation are 
best resolved by an absolute bar on corporate defamation actions . The 
apparent extremity of this approach is eliminated by consideration of the 
alternative legal remedies available in respect of statements which defame a 
body corporate. Taken holistically, a bar on corporate defamation plaintiffs 
coupled with the existence of alternative actions effectively protects free 
speech and corporate reputation. 
A Alternative Actions 
I Personal defamation 
It has been contended that individual members of a company are "absolutely 
precluded from suing in respect of a statement that tends to deprecate its 
business probity or prospects." 196 The purp01ted absolutism of this rule is 
misplaced. It is trite that an individual cannot sue in respect of a statement 
which relates only to a corporate entity. However, it is difficult to think "of a 
statement concerning a company where the imputation which it conveyed 
would not also relate to directors or to those persons who were known to be 
responsible for the conduct of the company which was the subject of the 
statement made." 197 The possibility of identity between a body corporate and 
its officers has been recognised.198 Patfield has suggested a distinction 
between mere members of an organisation , who cannot sue, and directors, 
196Campbell v Wilson [1934] SLR 249, 252 (Outer House, per Lord Mackay). 
I97 Hill, above n 86, 4-5. Westerway & Jones v Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd unreported (20 
August 1993) 14 (NSWSC, per David Levine J) . 
I 98See Bolton, above n 116, 172-173 and Tesco, above n 116, 170-171. 
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who may be able to, I99 justified on the basis that "when something is said or 
done, by the [organisation] ... it is in reality said or done by the group of 
persons who are responsible for its administration".200 It seems unnecessary to 
draw this distinction. Many corporate actions are not actions of directors, but 
of employed staff. A statement criticising such an action by the body corporate 
is capable of being understood as criticising the employees taking the action. 
The question of whether a corporate officer can maintain an individual 
defamation action in respect of a comment made about the body corporate 
should be answered, not by reference to a strict rule, but through application of 
ordinary principles of defamation. These require that a published statement 
sufficiently identify and defame the plaintiff. The plaintiff need not have been 
specifically identified in the statement. It is sufficient that the words are "such 
as reasonably in the circumstances would lead persons acquainted with the 
plaintiff to believe that he was the person referred to. "201 
Where a defamatory statement is directed against a body corporate, an action 
by an individual member of that body would require the plaintiff to rely on an 
innuendo or inference to establish that the statement referred to him or her. 
The plaintiff must prove that some recipients of the statement regarding the 
body corporate were aware of the extrinsic fact of the plaintiff's association 
with the relevant activity of the body corporate.202 
Where an organisation is small, there is little perceived distinction between 
the corporate entity and its officers. People having dealings with Brown's 
Dairy would not recognise a distinction between Mr and Mrs Brown and 
Brown's Dairy Ltd. A defamatory statement about the quality of service, 
administration, or solvency of Brown's Dairy Ltd will, to any person dealing 
with Brown's Dairy, reflect on Mr and Mrs Brown. 
The same cannot be said of a large organisation. A potentially defamatory 
statement about conduct by McDonald's does not necessarily affect the 
reputation of McDonald's senior international management. It is conceivable 
I 99F Patfield "Protecting the Reputation of Corporate Personnel, Organs and Associates" 
(1988) 18 UWALR 203,211. 
200Hill, above n 86, 4-5. 
20lcanavan, above n 34,238 (HC, per Isaacs J). Clark v Vare [1930] NZLR 430,433 (SC, 
per Myers CJ). 
202Consolidated Trust Co v Browne (1948) 49 SR(NSW) 86, 93-94 (Full SC, per Jordan CJ). 
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that some defamatory statements against a large corporation could give rise to 
personal defamation actions.203 However, it will often to be difficult for such 
an individual plaintiff to prove that they were identifiable from a statement 
about their organisation. Thus the availability of personal actions in large 
corporate situations will be much more circumscribed than in the small 
organisation context. 
The personal defamation action will protect the reputation of small 
organizations to the same extent as a corporate action. This protection will be 
extensive in New Zealand, where most companies have fewer than five 
members. 204 Conduct of the body corporate will be the conduct of a number of 
these identifiable officers, meaning that comment on the conduct will be 
capable of referring to those officers. In such organisations, there will 
commonly be financial identity between the body corporate and its officers. In 
a personal defamation action, the officer will be able to recover compensation 
for harm to their own reputation, and, as special damage, for the actual or 
likely pecuniary loss which accrues to them through the vehicle of the body 
corporate. 
2 Injurious falsehood 
An action for injurious falsehood will lie where a defendant has published a 
false statement with actual malice which has caused harm to the plaintiff.205 A 
statement is made with actual malice where the maker is aware that it is false, 
or is reckless as to whether it is true or false. 206 Actual malice for the purposes 
of injurious falsehood also requires that the defendant intended to harm the 
plaintiff, or was at least reckless.207 The burden of proof for these 
requirements is with the plaintiff, effectively reversing the defamation onus. 
Section 5 of the Defamation Act provides that, in an action for injurious 
falsehood, "it is not necessary to b1ing allege or prove special damage if the 
publication of the matter that is the subject of the proceedings is likely to 
203The ability to bring such an action is a question of personal defamation law and is outside 
the scope of this paper. However, there is a noticable trend to raise the barriers to suit for 
prominent individual defamation plaintiffs . See Lange 2000, above n 38, para 12. 
204Dugan, above n 99. 
205Ratcliffe, above n 20,527 (CA, per Bowen LJ); Joyce v Sengupta [1993] l WLR 337,341 
(CA, per Sir Donald Nicholls VC). 
206sullivan, above n 114, 279-80. See also Lange 2000, above n 38, para 42-49 relating to the 
misuse of the occasion of publication in the qualified privilege context, applying an analogous 
approach .. 
207 Customglass Boats Ltd v Salthouse Bras Ltd [ 1976] l NZLR 36, 49 (HC, per Mahon J). 
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cause pecuniary loss to the plaintiff". This damage requirement parallels the 
existing damage threshold for corporate defamation plaintiffs: actual or likely 
pecuniary loss. 
The tort of injurious falsehood is substantially similar to the US public figure 
defamation action. However, it does not carry the disadvantages of that action. 
There is no recovery of presumed or general damages by a corporate plaintiff. 
There is no uncertainty over whether the actual malice standard will apply in a 
given action. Costs awards can be made against an unsuccessful plaintiff. 
Injurious falsehood combines the logical approach to the damage threshold of 
Commonwealth corporate defamation with the freedom of speech protection 
evident in the United States. 
Where a body corporate is of such a size that its officers cannot maintain 
personal defamation actions, the body corporate may bring an action in 
injurious falsehood. Large corporate plaintiffs will therefore be subject to the 
actual malice standard, while small corporate plaintiffs will be able to recover 
through their officers without proving malice. The difficult distinction 
between public and private figure corporations is avoided. 
3 Fair Trading Act 
Section 9 of the Fair Trading Act 1986 provides that "no person shall, in trade, 
engage in conduct that is misleading or deceptive or is likely to mislead or 
deceive". This provision allows for an action resembling defamation, which 
allows recovery of proven pecuniary damages.208 To maintain such an action, 
a plaintiff must establish: 
(a) The making of a statement by the defendant, 
(b) That the statement was made 'in trade', 
(c) That the statement was misleading, 
(d) That the breach caused the particular injury in respect of which the remedy is 
sought209 
A statement will be made 'in trade' where it is made "in the course of 
commercial activity for the purpose of making a profit. It is not necessary that 
208Fair Trading Act 1986, ss 41, 43 [FT A] 
209Leucadia National Corporation v Wilson Neill Ltd (Unreported, 12 July 1996, High Court, 
Auckland, CP 365/94, per Fisher J) 26 [Leucadia]. 
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the act alleged form part of the day to day operating activities of the 
defendant" .210 
Such an action will not arise in respect of the publication of any matter in a 
newspaper or by a broadcaster except for advertisements and information 
about the supply of goods or services or the sale of land by the publisher or a 
connected body.211 Fair Trading Act actions will generally not lie against 
newspapers, but may lie against magazines. 
The main use of section 9 actions is in respect of statements made by trade 
rivals. The action has been used in respect of misleading comparative 
advertising in which the plaintiff's products have been criticised.212 The 
availability of such an action protects corporate reputations against attack by 
competitors. In these situations it is not necessary to prove actual malice or an 
imputation against a corporate officer. The action also appears to extend to 
provide unions with a remedy against misleading statements by employers, as 
these statements would be 'in trade', and to protect a wide range of corporate 
plaintiffs against criticism by powerful corporate critics. Section 9 could give 
a group such as Native Forest Action a remedy against Timberlands in respect 
of unjustified criticism. 
4 Negligence 
The tort of negligence is not available in New Zealand in respect of 
reputational damage.213 In rejecting such a tort, Cooke P held that defamation 
law represents "compromises gradually worked out ... over the years ... 
between competing values ... the law as to injury to reputation and freedom 
of speech is a field of its own. To impose the law of negligence upon it ... 
would be to introduce a distorting element".214 
Conversely, the House of Lords in Spring v Guardian Assurance held that a 
reputational injury may create negligence liability, distinguishing the New 
2l0Leucadia, above n 209, 26. 
211 FrA, s 15. 
212ER Squibb & Sons (NZ) Ltd v IC/ NZ Ltd (1988) 3 TCLR 296 (HC, per McGechan J). Alan 
H Reid Engineering Ltd v Ramset Fasteners (NZ) Ltd (1990) 4 TCLR 126 (HC, per 
McGechan J). 
213Bell-Booth Group v Attorney-General [1989] 3 NZLR 148, 156 (CA, per Cooke P) [Bell-
Booth]. Balfour v Attorney-General [1991] l NZLR 519,529 (CA, per Hardie Boys J) . 
214Bell-Booth, above n 213, 156. 
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Zealand authorities.21s This rule appears to be limited to its facts. Lord Reid 
accepts the proposition that reputational injury "cannot ordinarily be sustained 
by means of any other form of action"216 than defamation. However, the case 
concerned a reference given by an employer to an employee, which was held 
to impute an assumption of responsibility by the employer.217 Lord Reid's 
approach suggests that the ratio may be inapplicable outside the employment 
context. Further, the approach is out of step with the abolition of corporate 
defamation advocated in this paper and undermines freedom of expression. It 
should not be reimported to New Zealand to circumvent the proposed bar on 
corporate defamation plaintiffs. 
B Scope of Reputational Protection 
A bar on corporate defamation actions affords sufficient reputational 
protection to potential plaintiffs. All bodies corporate have standing to bring 
actions in injurious falsehood. This provides a limited right to bodies 
corporate to vindicate their reputations and recover compensation in respect of 
untrue, malicious and harmful statements. Small organizations have the 
further option of bringing a de facto defamation action in the name of an 
officer who is popularly identified with the body corporate. The rights of small 
bodies corporate are substantively unchanged. The rights of large bodies 
corporate are restricted but exist to the extent necessary to combat unfounded 
attacks. These rights are reinforced by the possibility of a Fair Trading Act 
action, carrying a diminished burden on the plaintiff in response to criticism 
by trade rivals. 
This approach raises the barrier to action by large corporate plaintiffs against 
which the power analysis is valid. 218 In relation to organizations for which the 
power analysis is invalid, the barriers are essentially unchanged. This reflects 
the approach taken in the government sphere. In Derbyshire, Lord Keith 
comments that injurious falsehood and personal defamation gave "all the 
protection which was necessary".219 A majority in Ballina Shire Council also 
215[1995] 2 AC 296,324 (HL, per Lord Goff) [Spring]. 
216Spring, above n 215, 323 (per Lord Goff), quoting Foaminol Laboratories v British Artid 
Plastics [1941] 2 All ER 393,399 (HC, per Hallett J). 
217Spring, above n 215,324 (per Lord Goff). 
218See above Part III B 2. 
219 Above n 45, 550-551. 
accepted the utility of injurious falsehood actions at the suit of government 
bodies. 220 
C Protection of Free Speech 
The proposed approach protects free speech as a democratic right and as a 
broader human right. The chilling effect of defamation is minimised. 
1 Practical impact 
The key to this protection of free speech is the almost complete elimination of 
the ability of powerful corporate plaintiffs to silence actual critics and deter 
potential critics. It will usually be difficult, if not impossible, for corporate 
plaintiffs to show that their critics were acting maliciously. Commonly critics 
of corporations make their statements in good faith. Steel and Morris in the 
McLibel litigation,221 Professor Oswald in the Upjohn litigation,222 and Mr 
Campion in the Bognar Regis UDC case223 all appear to have believed that 
their statements were true. 
The proposed approach will protect free speech from the initiation of 
proceedings through to any judicial determination. Corporate plaintiffs will be 
less likely to issue proceedings which will require them to prove actual 
malice. Critics will be able to make statements less deten-ed by the potential 
costs of litigation. Where proceedings are commenced, the burden of proof is 
shifted from the defendant to the corporate plaintiff. Rather than requiring 
defendants to bring evidence of the truth of their statements, actions involving 
powerful corporate plaintiffs will require those plaintiffs to prove that the 
defendant was at least reckless as to the truth of their statement, and possibly 
that it was made with an intention to harm. This requires the plaintiff to prove 
the subjective intention of the defendant. Such a burden will clearly be 
difficult for the plaintiff to discharge. The defendant has no positive onus. The 
difficulty of the defendant's case, and so the costs likely to be incurred by the 
defendant, are reduced. In reducing the number of suits and making those suits 
easier to defend, the proposed model removes the deterrents confronting those 
220Above n 45, 693-694 (per Gleeson CJ), 733 (per Mahoney JA). Cf 711 (per Kirby P 
dissenting). 
22 1Nicholson, above n 12, 4 n 16. 
222Penzi, above n 3,219. 
223Weir, above n 5, 242-243. 
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contemplating criticism of large bodies corporate. This effect is reinforced by 
the elimination of much of the uncertainty in the law. 
The availability of the action under section 9 of the Fair Trading Act, which 
closely resembles the existing law of corporate defamation, effectively 
restricts corporate actions to situations where the defendant is a commercial 
entity. Such parties are likely to be better resourced than individuals, and 
consequently less likely to be deterred from criticism through the chilling 
effect. Further, the likelihood of a broad resource balance between plaintiff 
and defendant in such an action reduces the ability of plaintiffs to specifically 
silence a critic by forcing them into bankruptcy.224 
2 Legitimacy of limitation on free speech 
Under this approach, there are three restrictions on the freedom of speech: the 
injurious falsehood action available to all corporate plaintiffs, the personal 
defamation action available to small corporate plaintiffs, and the Fair Trading 
Act only available where the defendant has acted in a trade context. 
These restrictions are demonstrably justifiable through an application by 
analogy of section 5 of the Bill of Rights and the Moonen principles. The 
objective of the restrictions is the protection of property interests attaching to 
reputation, and the reputations of officers. The protections afforded by the 
three possible actions are a minimised interference with free expression, and 
so can be said to be in reasonable proportion to their objective. Injurious 
falsehood and the Fair Trading Act action are economic actions, and are 
therefore rationally related to the economic protection which they afford a 
body corporate. The personal defamation action is also rationally related to its 
objective of providing reputational protection to individuals. The protections 
afforded are necessary and justified. 
An injurious falsehood action is needed to protect bodies corporate from "false 
and malicious statements aimed at causing, and causing (sic), financial 
harm."225 This protection is narrowly drawn and has been found to be an 
acceptable limit on the democratic right to freedom of expression.226 Further, 
224As occured in Bognar Regis, (Weir, above n 5,245) and the Mcdonald's litigation 
(Nicholson, above n 12, 3). 
225Ballina, above n 45, 694 (per Gleeson CJ). 
226Derbyshire, above n 45 , 551 (per Lord Keith) (referring to Article 10 of the ECHR). 
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the substantially similar United States public figure defamation action 1s 
viewed as an acceptable limit on the broader human right to free speech.221 
Similarly, the personal defamation action for smaller plaintiffs is a legitimate 
limit on both interpretations of freedom of expression. It is available only to 
officers of small bodies corporate in which there is identity between the body 
corporate and its officers. Defamation actions by small bodies corporate do 
not raise the policy issues relevant to large bodies corporate, and have been 
accepted as a legitimate limit on the wide interpretation of freedom of 
speech.228 
The Fair Trading Act action is also a legitimate limit on free expression.229 It 
affects only expressions in a trade context, which "are rarely intended to air a 
matter of public interest but rather to secure some advantage for the . . . 
trader".230 Such statements will rarely be deserving of free speech protection. 
Further, its application is limited to situations of comparative resource 
equality between plaintiff and defendant. 
VII CONCLUSION 
London has been described as the "libel capital of the world"23I because of the 
ease with which English law allows corporate plaintiffs to silence their critics. 
This is probably only because no-one has noticed New Zealand. 
The law in England does give some effect to a democratic model of freedom 
of speech through its bar on governmental defamation actions. In New 
Zealand, even the existence of such a bar remains uncertain. Under the current 
law in New Zealand, corporate plaintiffs have the capacity to silence existing 
critics and to deter future criticism. Although this power is not often visibly 
exercised, the knowledge that it exists exerts a chilling effect over public 
debate. 
227Docherty, above n 171 ,266. Sullivan , above n 114, 279-280. 
228Snead, above n 184, 1328. 
229NZAPMB, above n 46, 17. The compatibility of the Fair Trading Act action with the wide 
interpretation of freedom of speech has not been addressed. However, the limitation appears 
to be justifiable. 
230Patfield (1993), above n 121, 304. 
231Penzi, above n 3,211. 
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This paper sets out a principled approach to the availability of defamation 
actions at the suit of bodies corporate and identifies the alternative remedies 
for reputational harm. This analysis shows that corporate defamation actions 
are unnecessary and place an unjustifiable fetter on freedom of expression. 
Both the common law and the legislature have the capacity to bar actions by 
corporate plaintiffs. This capacity should be exercised. 
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